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Abstract
We forecast income growth over the period 2000-2050 in the US, Canada, and
France. To ground the forecasts on relationships that are as robust as possible to
changes in the environment, we use a quantitative theoretical approach which con-
sists in calibrating and simulating a general equilibrium model. Compared to ex-
isting studies, we allow for life uncertainty and migrations, use generational ac-
counting studies to link taxes and public expenditures to demographic changes,
and take into account the interaction between education and work experience.
Forecasts show that growth will be weaker over the period 2010-2040. The gap
between the US and the two other countries is increasing over time. France will
catch-up and overtake Canada in 2020. Investigating alternative policy scenarios,
we show that increasing the effective retirement age to 63 would be most profitable
for France, reducing its gap with the US by one third. A decrease in social security
benefits would slightly stimulate growth but would have no real impact on the gap
between the countries.
Keywords: Aging, Forecast, Computable General Equilibrium, Education, Experi-
ence.
JEL Classification: D58, E6, H55, J11, O40.
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Introduction
In most industrialized countries, the rise in life expectancy and the drop in fertility
rates progressively increase the share of the elderly in the population. In the next
decades, this phenomenonwill be particularly strong as large baby boom cohorts reach
the retirement age. As illustrated in Cutler et al. (1990), this demographic transition
really starts in Japan. The European Union (especially western countries such as Ger-
many, Italy, Belgium and France) and Canada seem to age before the US and after
Japan, so quite in the middle of the wave of aging. In the US, the elderly dependency
ratio (population aged 65+ / population 15-64) will increase from 18% in 1990 to a peak
of 32% by 2035. In France, the share of elderly should double between 1995 and 2045.
Movements are stronger in Canada where the dependency rate starts at the US level
in 2000 but is expected to reach 42% in 2050. Even if demographic institutes usually
provide alternative projections, the extent of these population trends is now estimated
with a relative high accuracy level by demographers. Population aging appears as
an inescapable ending and its magnitude in the next fifty years cannot be affected by
policy.
Economists and policymakers have been concerned in quantifying the potential
effects of demographic changes upon the economy. In this paper, we focus on the
potential effect of aging on GDP per capita in three important developed countries,
Canada, France and the USA. The channels through which demography affects the
growth prospect of industrialized economies are manifold. First, population changes
have a direct impact on the size of the labor force. After 2000, the growth rate of the
population aged 15-64 is expected to decrease in most industrialized countries (espe-
cially in France and Canada where the growth rate becomes negative). Second, aging
also modifies saving rates and capital accumulation which, in turn, impacts on wages
rates and interest rates. Since the seminal overlapping generations model of Auer-
bach and Kotlikoff (1987), a large number of studies1 have concluded that aging will
stimulate the capital stock per worker and wages rates while reducing interest rates2.
Third, aging has also large effects on the characteristics of the labor force. As argued
1See e.g. Auerbach et al. (1989), Bo¨rsch-Supan (1996) or Hviding andMe´rette (1998) on various OECD
countries, Chauveau and Loufir (1997) on the G7 countries or, more recently Hirte (2002) on Germany,
Miles (1999) on the UK and the INGENUE Team (2002) on the World economy.
2One exception is Fehr, Jokisch, and Kotlikoff (2003)who argue that the rise in wages tax (particularly
payroll taxes) reduce saving and capital accumulation. Over the course of the century, capital shortages
progressively lower real wages per unit of human capital and stimulate interest rates.
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byWasmer (2001b), demographic changes in the late 35 years induced a substitution of
“low education-high experience” workers by “high education-low experience” work-
ers. The stock of experience is now increasing at a fast pace. However, as the baby
boom generations will leave the labor force, the stock of experience will decrease af-
ter the year 2020, while the average education level is expected to peak around 2040.
Finally, the public finance consequences (and their incidence in terms of intergener-
ational transfers) have raised a considerable anxiety amongst scholars. The financial
sustainability of the social security system is obviously the most important political
and economic issue related to aging. Can or should current benefits be maintained?
How far can we increase social security contributions?
The consequences of aging described above are still subject to uncertainty and net
effects cannot be determined a priori. They must be simulated within a fully articu-
lated and calibrated model. The purpose of our study is to integrate the mechanisms
sketched above in a general equilibrium, OLG framework. Compared to existing stud-
ies, our model builds on a strong demographic block which allows for life uncertainty
and migratory movements. In each country, the evolution of the population size and
the structure per age corresponds to official projections. A particular attention is also
devoted to the public sector modelling. Using generational accounting studies3, we
closely link the evolution of taxes and expenditures to demographic changes. Finally,
we take into account the interactions between education and experience on the labor
market. We derive the impact of population changes and educational decisions of the
young on the stock of experience and the stock of education.
We use this structural model to forecast the GDP per capita, using the demographic
movements as a key source of changes. Our central projection is based on constant
policies. Retirement age and the debt-GDP ratio are kept constant, public transfers
and government expenditures are indexed on the total factor productivity. The wage
tax rate (including social security contribution and income tax) is adjusted to meet the
debt-GDP ratio target.
Under these assumptions, forecasted incomes display three main features. In all
three countries, the growth rate will be weaker over the period 2010-2040. The gap be-
tween the leading country (the USA) and the two other countries (France and Canada)
is increasing over the period 2000-2050. France will catch-up and overtake Canada in
2020.
3See Gokhale et al. (2001) for the USA, Crettez, Feist, and Raffelu¨schen (1999) for France and Hicks
(1998) for Canada.
4
The following elements are found essential to generate these results. Potential labor
forces shrink in France and Canada between 2020 and 2050, but continue to increase in
the USA. The dynamics of education capital is favorable to France and Canada, since
they start from a lower level compared to the USA. The dynamics of experience capital
is relatively more favorable in the USA.
Next we evaluate the robustness of our results to policy choices. Two different
policy measures are simulated. First, we consider that the effective retirement age
increases to a similar level (age 63) in all three countries. Such a policy induces major
changes on the French economy where the current retirement age is lower than in the
other countries. The gap between France and the USA is reduced by one third. Then,
we consider a scenario where the level of pension benefits is adjusted downward so as
to keep wage taxes constant over the period 2000-2050. This policy change has a small
impact on the gap between the different countries.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the model. The
calibration is presented in section 2. Section 3 provides the baseline forecasts. The sen-
sitivity of GDP forecasts to policy changes is examined in Section 4. Finally, Section 5
concludes.
1 The Model
We consider a model economy where households and firms maximize their objective
subject to resource constraints, and where a government levies taxes and issues debt to
finance spending and transfers.4 All demographic variables, i.e. fertility, mortality and
migration, are exogenous. We shall then use the model to map official demographic
forecast into predicted level of gdp per capita and other economic variables.
1.1 Population
Model time is discrete and goes from 0 to +∞. At each date, some individuals die and
a new generation appears. Households reaching age 15 at year t belong to generation
4Compared to our previous work (Bouzahzah, de la Croix, and Docquier 2002), both demographic
variables and public finance are much more detailed, and we distinguish experience and education in
the modeling of human capital.
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t. The size of the young generation increases over time at an exogenous growth rate:
N0,t+1 = N0,tmt
where N0,t measures the initial size of generation t andmt is one plus the demographic
growth rate, including both fertility and migration.
Each household lives a maximum of 8 periods (a = 0, ..., 7) but face a cumulative
survival probability decreasing with age. The size of each generation declines deter-
ministically through time. However, this decline is affected by net migration flows:
Na,t+a = N0,tβa,t+a + Ma,t+a
where 0 ≤ βa,t+a ≤ 1 is the fraction of generation t alive at age a (hence, at period t+ a)
and Ma,t+a is the stock of migrants of age a. We also have β0,t = 1. Obviously, the total
population at time t amounts to Nt = ∑
7
a=0 Na,t.
The demographic growth rate, immigration flows and the survival probability vec-
tor vary over time. Taking account of immigration flows enables us to use official
demographic observations and projections.
1.2 Households
Individuals have a positive probability to die during each period of life. In the spirit of
Arrow-Debreu, we postulate the existence of a market for every contingent consump-
tion. These markets open before the resolution of uncertainty: each individual has the
possibility to insure himself against uncertainty at the beginning of his life. Hence, the
problem of agents born at time t is to select a consumption contingent plan and his
education in order to maximize his expected utility subject to his intertemporal budget
constraint, given the sequence of contingent wages and prices. The expected utility
function is time-separable and logarithmic:
E(Ut) =
7
∑
a=0
βa,t+a ln(ca,t+a) (1)
where ca,t+a is the consumption of generation t at age a. The life-cycle budget con-
straint requires equality between the expected value of expenditures and the value of
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income. For a household born with age 0 at time t, it is written as
7
∑
a=0
pa,t+a [ca,t+a(1+ τ
c
t+a)− Ta,t+a] =
7
∑
a=0
(
ωLa,t+a +ω
E
a,t+aea,t+a +ω
H
a,t+aha,t+a
)
ℓa,t+a
(2)
where τct+a is the consumption tax rate at period t + a; pa,t+a is the discounted price
of one unit of good in case he/she is alive at age a; Ta,t+a denotes the amount of
transfer received at age a including education benefits, pensions and other transfers
(health care, family allowances, social benefits...); ℓa,t+a measures labor supply at age a;
raw labor, education and experience are supplied at net-of-taxes contingent discounted
wages ωLa,t+a, ω
H
a,t+a and ω
E
a,t+a.
As in Fehr, Jokisch, and Kotlikoff (2003), we assume that migrants of each genera-
tion have the same characteristics as natives, i.e. they have the same implicit wealth,
experience and education.
The vector of labor supply for generation t (defining labor supply at all ages) is
ℓt = (qt(1− ut), qt+1, qt+2, qt+3, qt+4(1− αt+4), 0, 0, 0) (3)
where qt is the exogenous participation rate at time t, 0 ≤ ut ≤ 1 measures the en-
dogenous time invested in education in the first period of life and αt+4 stands for the
(exogenous) time spent in retirement in the fifth period of life (i.e. between age 55 and
age 65). The variable qt is introduced to capture the rise in women’s participation rates
in the labor market.
In this model we consider labor supply as exogenous, except in the first period
where education decisions occur. In Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) and many sub-
sequent works, labor supply was endogenized. It is then necessary to calibrate the
age-specific parameter of preference for leisure so as to match the age-profile of par-
ticipation rates observed in the most recent period. However, all these models fail
at matching the time path of participation rates, especially the rise in women partic-
ipation rates over the last three decades. One way to address this issue would be to
assume that preference parameters have changed over time. Such changes can then
be calibrated to match observations. To avoid modeling changes in preference param-
eters and to keep our forecast assumptions as transparent as possible we decided to
keep participation rates exogenous.
The education decision made in the first period of life completely determines the
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vectors of experience, skills, education subsidies and public transfers for generation t.
Following Wasmer (2001b), the individual stock of experience sums up past participa-
tion rates on the labor market. The stock of education transforms education investment
when young into labor efficiency according to a decreasing return function. Public
transfers sum up education subsidies, pension benefits and other transfers. These vec-
tors are written as
et = (0, (1− ut)qt, (1− ut)qt + qt+1, (1− ut)qt + qt+1 + qt+2,
(1− ut)qt + qt+1 + qt+2 + qt+3, 0, 0, 0) , (4)
ht =
(
0, ǫu
ψ
t , ǫu
ψ
t , ǫu
ψ
t , ǫu
ψ
t , 0, 0, 0
)
, (5)
where ǫ > 0 and ψ ∈ (0, 1) are two parameters of the educational technology;
Tt =
(
vtqtutω
L
0,t + γ0gt, γ1gt+1, γ2gt+2, γ3gt+3,
αt+4bt+4 + γ4gt+4, bt+5 + γ5gt+5, bt+6 + γ6gt+6, bt+7 + γ7gt+7) , (6)
where vt is the rate of subsidy on the cost of education, bt is the pension benefit allo-
cated to each full-time retiree at period t and γagt is the amount of age-related transfer
made by the government to agents of age a. The parameter γa determines the share of
total transfer gt in favor of age a.
Since there is no utility of leisure, the problem of households is separable. Individ-
uals first maximize the expected value of income - right hand side of (2) - with respect
to educational investment ut. Then, in a second step, they maximize the expected util-
ity function and select the optimal contingent plan subject to the budget constraint
in which the education investment is set to its optimal value. The optimal education
investment is given by
u∗t =

 ǫψ ∑4a=1
[
ωHa,t+aℓa,t+a
]
(1− vt)qtωL0,t + ∑
4
a=1
[
ωEa,t+aℓa,t+a
]


1
1−ψ
(7)
Obviously, the optimal education investment balances the marginal gain of education
at the numerator (future path of net returns on education) and the marginal cost of
education at the denominator; the marginal cost includes both the foregone wagewhen
young and foregone net returns on experience.
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Maximizing utility with respect to the levels of consumption determines the law of
motion of contingent consumption expenditures over the lifetime:
ca+1,t+a+1 =
(1+ rt+1)(1 + τ
c
t )
(1+ τct+1)
ca,t+a ∀a = 0, ..., 6 (8)
Substituting (7) and (8) into the budget constraint (2) gives the optimal level of
consumption in the first period of life. The aggregated consumption at period t then
amounts to Ct = ∑a Na,tca,t.
1.3 Firms
At each period of time, a representative firm uses labor in efficiency units (Qt) and
physical capital (Kt) to produce a composite good (Yt). We assume a Cobb-Douglas
production function with constant returns to scale:
Yt = AtK
1−ϕ
t Q
ϕ
t (9)
where ϕmeasures the share of wage income in the national product, and At represents
total factor productivity. (TFP), growing at the rate Gt − 1. We consider a autoregres-
sive process for the growth factor:
At
At−1
≡ Gt = (1− λ)G + λGt−1 + εt (10)
where G is the long run growth factor of the TFP, λ is a parameter of inertia in produc-
tivity shocks and εt is a iid shock process.
The quantity of efficiency units of labor combines physical labor supply and human
capital according to a Cobb-Douglas transformation function. Human capital is itself
a linear combination of experience and education. Formally, we have
Qt = L
1−δ
t [µEt + (1− µ)Ht]
δ (11)
where Lt measures the input of manpower at time t; Et measures the input of expe-
rience; Ht is the input of education; δ is a parameter representing the importance of
human capital in the determination of labor income; µ is a parameter of preference for
experience. In an other paper (de la Croix and Docquier 2003) we explore the impor-
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tance of complementarities between education and experience to understand how the
skill and experience premium changed in the past. We use here a simplified production
function where education and experience are perfect substitutes, after having checked
that forecasts are not very sensitive to the assumed elasticity of substitution between
the two.
The representative firm behaves competitively on the factor markets and maxi-
mizes profits:
Yt − (rt + d)Kt −w
L
t Lt −w
H
t Ht− w
E
t Et (12)
where d is the depreciation rate of physical capital. This behavior requires the equality
of the marginal productivity of each factor to its rate of return. They may be written as
rt = (1− ϕ)AtYt/Kt − d (13)
wLt = ϕ(1− δ)AtYt/Lt (14)
wEt = ϕδµAtK
1−ϕ
t Q
ϕ−1
t L
1−δ
t [µEt + (1− µ)Ht]
δ−1 (15)
wHt = ϕδ(1− µ)AtK
1−ϕ
t Q
ϕ−1
t L
1−δ
t [µEt + (1− µ)Ht]
δ−1 (16)
1.4 The Public Sector
The government issues bonds and levies taxes on labor earnings (τwt ), consumption
expenditures (τct ) and capital income (τ
k
t ) to finance public transfers and general public
consumption. Five types of spending are distinguished: education subsidies, social
security benefits, other transfers (health care, family allowance, social benefits), non
age-specific general consumption expenditure and interest payments on public debt.
The government budget constraint may be written as
τwt (w
L
t Lt + w
E
t Et +w
H
t Ht) + τ
c
t Ct + τ
k
t rtKt + Dt+1− (1+ rt)Dt
= N0,tvtqtutw
L
t (1− τ
w
t ) + ∑
a
Na,tγagt + ϑtYt + (N4,tαt +
7
∑
a=5
Na,t)bt (17)
where Dt denotes the public debt at the beginning of period t; ϑt is the share of non-
transfer public consumption in GDP and γagt is the amount of transfer per capita
allocated to individuals of age a.
Several scenarios can be considered to balance this budget constraint. The budget
can be balanced through tax adjustments, expenditure adjustments or changes in the
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public debt. We assume in the sequel that the path of debt is given and the tax rate τwt
adjusts to meet the debt-GDP ratio target.
1.5 Equilibrium
At each date, the composite good is taken as numeraire. The spot price is thus normal-
ized to one: pt = 1. We denote by rt+1 the interest rate between dates t and t + 1, the
appropriate discount factor applied to age-a income and spending is given by
Ra,t+a ≡
t+a
∏
s=t+1
(1+ rs(1− τ
k
s ))
−1
where, by convention, R0,t = 1. Spot gross wages at time t + a are denoted by w
L
t+a,
wHt+a and w
E
t+a. They correspond to the marginal productivities of labor components,
as shown above.
Since there is perfect competition on the insurance market, the contingent prices
are related to the spot prices through a set of no arbitrage conditions. The equilibrium
(discounted) contingent prices of the consumption good at time t are given by:
pa,t+a = Ra,t+aβa,t+apt+a = Ra,t+aβa,t+a (18)
Equilibrium (discounted) contingent net wages are:
ωLa,t+a = Ra,t+aβa,t+aw
L
t+a(1− τ
w
t+a)
ωEa,t+a = Ra,t+aβa,t+aw
E
t+a(1− τ
w
t+a) (19)
ωHa,t+a = Ra,t+aβa,t+aw
H
t+a(1− τ
w
t+a)
where τwt+a denotes the rate of tax on labor income at time t. The originality of the
model is that labor income consists of three components: manpower, experience and
education. Equivalently, individual gross wages are the sum of these three elements so
that a tax on labor income τwt affects similarly all wage components.
The equilibrium condition on the goods market writes as follows:
Yt + K
⋆
t =
7
∑
a=0
Na,tca,t
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ct
+Kt+1− (1− d)Kt︸ ︷︷ ︸
It
+ ϑtYt︸︷︷︸
Gt
(20)
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where K⋆t represents the asset holdings brought into the country by migrants.
The labor market equilibrium equalizes the demand for labor from firms Lt, Et and
Ht to the sum of the individual supplies:
Lt =
7
∑
a=0
Na,tℓa,t, Et =
7
∑
a=0
Na,tℓa,tea,t, Ht =
7
∑
a=0
Na,tℓa,tha,t (21)
2 Calibration
Three model economies are calibrated following exactly the same methodology in or-
der to make forecasts comparable. Calibration implies using data for observed ex-
ogenous variables, fixing some constant parameters, and choosing paths for the unob-
served exogenous variables in order to match a series of characteristics. Calibration is
not focused on reproducing characteristics of a given steady state, where all the inter-
esting information on population history, experience stocks and skills per age group
would be lost. Instead, the equilibrium is computed as a transition from one steady
state in 1900 to one another in 2250. By starting in 1900, the stocks of education and
experience around 1960 reflect the correct history of the population.
2.1 Simulation Method
Our dynamic model is characterized by a set of non-linear equations of the form:
f (z1t−4, . . . , z
1
t , z
2
t , . . . , z
2
t+4, xt) = 0
where zit denotes an endogenous variable at t, which can be predetermined (z
1
t ), or
forward looking (z2t ). The maximum lead or lag in the model is of 4 periods, which is
related to the length of active life. f is a function representing our dynamic model and
xt is the vector of exogenous variables and parameters.
The problem also includes initial conditions on predetermined variables, which
here correspond to an initial steady state in 1900:
z1−3, . . . , z
1
0 = z
1
init.
As far as terminal conditions are concerned, we assume that exogenous variables stay
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constant after a given date. Hence, if the corresponding steady state is a saddle-point,
the economy should converge to this steady state, as long as it does not start too far
away from it (because the saddle-point stability only applies locally).
Since f is non-linear, it is not possible in general to solve the model analytically. The
general problem is to solve a system of finite difference equations with initial and ter-
minal conditions. Approximating the infinite horizon by a finite one, (that means that
we assume that the steady state is actually reached at the end of the horizon of simu-
lation) the complete system has as many equations as the number of equations at each
period multiplied by the simulation horizon plus the initial and terminal conditions:


z1−3 . . . , z
1
0 = z
1
init
f (z1−3, . . . , z
1
1, z
2
1, . . . , z
2
5, x1) = 0
...
...
...
f (z1T−4, . . . , z
1
T, z
2
T, . . . , z
2
T+4, xT) = 0
z2T+1, . . . , z
2
T+4 = z
2
steady state
(S)
The system (S) is then solved for zt using a Newton-Raphson relaxation method
put forward by Laffargue (1990) and Boucekkine (1995) for solving dynamic nonlinear
models with perfect foresight. With this technique, the Newton-Raphson improve-
ment at each iteration is computed by triangulation (instead of inversion) of the matrix
of the first derivatives of the system. As Boucekkine (1995) shows, this method al-
lows to characterize the nature of the dynamics of the model (explosivity, saddle-point
trajectory or infinite number of stable solutions) without having to linearize it and to
compute the eigenvalues of the linearized system. In particular, it is easy to determine
whether the convergence of the algorithm is due to the existence of saddle-point tra-
jectory or not. Indeed, the algorithm is characterized by an explosivity property in
the case where an infinity of stable solutions exist (see Boucekkine and Le Van (1996)).
This explosivity property is in fact common to all convergent relaxation methods. The
explosive behavior is put forward by a simple numerical procedure relying on the ini-
tialization of the relaxation. Initializing the relaxation with values slightly different
from the steady state leads to an explosive behavior at the first Newton-Raphson im-
provement. This routine is implemented with the package Dynare of Juillard (1996).
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2.2 Observed Exogenous Variables
Demography. Past and future survival probabilities βa,t and population shares per
age are taken from official demographic institutes. For France, we use observations
and forecasts from INED and INSEE. For the US, data and forecasts are taken from the
Population Division of the US Census Bureau. For Canada, we use observations from
the Department of Human Resources and Skills Development and forecasts are taken
from the United Nations database. As for demographic projections, we always use the
central scenario.
Figures 1, 2 and 3 describe the demographic transition experienced in all three
countries. There are important differences in the dynamics of population. After 2000,
the population size keeps increasing in the USA. Consequently, the growth rate of the
labor force (population aged 15-64) remains positive. In France and Canada (from 2030
onwards), the population stagnates and the labor force decreases. The magnitude of
aging is also different. As appearing on Figure 3, the old-age dependency increases
much in Canada (from 18 to 42 percent between 2000 and 2050) and France (from 25 to
50 percent) and moderately in the US (from 18 to 32 percent). Hence, Canada is likely
to age more drastically than the other two countries.
[Figure 1 about here.]
[Figure 2 about here.]
[Figure 3 about here.]
Education and participation rates. The time invested in education is computed using
school attendance and educational attainment measures. For France, the time invested
in education is computed using school attendance measures for the 15-24 population
reported in Estrade and Minni (1996). For the US, we use the data and projections
on educational attainment by Cheeseman Day and Bauman (2000). For Canada, data
on educational attainment are taken from Laroche and Me´rette (2000) who split the
Canadian population by age and by the highest diploma obtained from 1971 to 1996.
The old age participation rate α is computed using the effective retirement age data
from Blondal and Scarpetta (1997). Overall participation rates qt are normalized to 1 in
2000 and computed from Wasmer (2001a) for the three countries.
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Public finance. Regarding public finance, our model distinguishes three proportional
taxes: the labor income tax, the capital income tax and indirect taxes. For France,
the indirect tax rate and the rate of tax on capital income are estimated by Carey and
Tchilinguirian (2000) at 18% and 24% respectively for 1995. The labor income tax rate
is endogenous in the model but needs a target value: it has been estimated by Eurostat
(1999) at 44% in 1995. For the US, we calibrate these tax rates in such a way that the
shares of revenues in GDP correspond to the estimations of Gokhale, Page, and Stur-
rock (1999), i.e. 8% for labor income, 7% for indirect taxes and 5% for capital income
in 20005. For Canada, we build on Charbonneau (1997) who provides complete time
series of implicit tax rates on labor income, capital income and consumption from 1961
to 1995. We distinguish two types of government spending (net of debt charges), i.e.
non age-specific public consumption and age-specific transfers. For the composition of
these categories and for the age profiles of transfers, we build on generational account-
ing exercises, i.e. Crettez, Feist, and Raffelu¨schen (1999) for France, Gokhale, Page, and
Sturrock (1999) for the US and Hicks (1998) for Canada. The history of non age-specific
spending is based on OECD data for the period 1960-1995. The history of public debt
is taken from official statistics.
2.3 Parameters
A set of parameters is set a priori, the same for all three countries. By doing so, wemin-
imize the amount of assumed differences between them. The labor share in output, ϕ,
is set to 0.7, (this value is commonly used in calibrated model of the US economy. In
France, the labor share equals 0.693 in 1995, according to INSEE. For Canada, Fouge`re
and Me´rette (1999) use a share of 0.66.) The depreciation rate of capital d equals 0.4.
This value implies an annual depreciation rate of 5%. The parameter µ in the produc-
tion function is a scale parameter which is set to 0.5. Two parameters are important in
shaping the wage profile per age: the share of raw labor in labor income (1− δ) is set
to 0.4, and the scale parameter in the production function of human capital ǫ is set to
2.1. They will both deliver an adequate wage profile (see below). The parameter ψ is
the elasticity of education capital to investment in education. It should be calibrated
using the estimated elasticity of future earnings with respect to additional schooling
5In our simulations, we consider (i) that the French tax rate on consumption expenditures increases
linearly from 10% in 1940 to 18% in 1990 and (ii) that the tax rate on capital income increases from 15%
to 24% over the same period. The same evolution is applied to the US tax rates (from 8% to 14% for the
indirect tax rate and from 10% to 28% for the capital income tax rate).
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(see e.g. Psacharopoulos (1994) for a survey of these elasticities); we take the value
ψ = 0.6 which is in accordance with a return to an additional year of schooling of
11.5%, assuming that this additional year of schooling raises education expenditure by
20%.
2.4 Identification of Unobserved Exogenous Variables
The model contains some exogenous variables for which time series data are not avail-
able: total factor productivity, At, the rate of subsidy on education expenditures, vt, the
level of pension benefit, bt, and the scale of the age-specific transfer profile, gt. These
four exogenous processes are chosen so as to match available time series data for four
endogenous variables which are closely related to the unknowns: the GDP growth rate,
the share of social security and other transfers in GDP, and the education investment
of young cohorts.
Basically, our identification process implies swapping four exogenous variables for
four endogenous variables and solving the identification step with the algorithm pro-
posed by Laffargue (1990) and Boucekkine (1995). Our identification process resembles
Sims (1990) backsolving method for stochastic general equilibrium models. We use a
similar idea of treating exogenous processes as endogenous, not to solve a model, but
as a calibration device in a deterministic framework.
The autoregressive process (10) is calibrated on the resulting TFP dynamics by pool-
ing country results. The average growth factor is set to G = 1.2, which corresponds to
a long-run growth rate of 1.84% per year. The correlation between Gt−G and Gt−1−G
then determines λ = 0.384. The iid shock process εt is estimated as a residual. Hence,
we consider a similar growth process for all three countries except for the shock term.
Figure 4 depicts the growth factor of total factor productivity for the three countries.
[Figure 4 about here.]
Notice that our backsolving identification procedure allows to calibrate the model
“dynamically”. This is much better and rigorous than calibrating on a hypothetical
steady state (in 1900 or in 2250) and re-scaling exogenous variables to obtain reason-
able outcomes at a given date, as it is usually done in Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987)
tradition.
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2.5 Wage and Assets Profile per Age
The quality of our model depends on its ability to match individual profiles per age.
Let us focus on wage and wealth profiles for the US and for France. Figure 5 provides
the wage profile per age for the year 2000 in the US, comparing the model’s outcome
with PSID data. Figure 6 conveys the same information for France, where the actual
data were obtained from INSEE. The shape of the profile per age is fully determined
by the accumulation of experience; no need to assume an exogenous profile as in Auer-
bach and Kotlikoff (1987). This figure comforts us in the choice of δ and ǫ. We however
overestimate the wage for old workers in the US; to correct for this, one could assume
a positive depreciation rate of experience in the US, but we preferred to keep the same
specification for all countries.
[Figure 5 about here.]
[Figure 6 about here.]
It is usually argued that the standard life cycle model with selfish households does
not provide a good description of wealth accumulation after retirement. Figures 7 and
8 reports asset profiles per age at time 2000, together with their empirical counterpart
from PSID for the US and from INSEE for France. It appears that our model matches
the profile, except for the very old people (85-94). Hence, there is no need to suppose
a pure time preference parameter on top of the mortality rate. The annuity market is
also helpful to avoid poverty in the old age.
[Figure 7 about here.]
[Figure 8 about here.]
3 Forecasts
Once the model has been calibrated, we run a baseline simulation over the period
1900-2250, where future values of policy variables are kept at their level observed in
2000. We concentrate our attention on the determinants of economic growth. From (9),
growth is driven by total factor productivity, the accumulation of physical capital and
the dynamics of employment in efficiency units.
17
Regarding employment, Figure 2 indicates that the labor force grows at a slower
pace in all countries between 2000 and 2040. The phenomenon is particularly impor-
tant in France and Canada. The characteristics of the labor force also change. The next
three figures describe the average education level and the average experience of work-
ers. On the one hand, the average education level will rise in all countries. However,
the rise is stronger in France and Canada, since they start from a lower level compared
to the USA in 2000. On the other hand, the dynamics of experience capital is more
favorable in the USA. In each country, the average experience of worker increases be-
tween 2000 and 2010, then decreases (until 2050 in Canada, until 2030 in France and the
USA). In 2050, the net gain in experience is important in the US while not significant
in France and Canada.
[Figure 9 about here.]
[Figure 10 about here.]
[Figure 11 about here.]
Regarding capital accumulation, it is usually argued that aging raises the stock of
capital compared to the supply of labor, hence expanding real wages while decreas-
ing interest rates. The prospect for such a capital deepening arises from the fact that
the oldsters are the main suppliers of capital while the young are the main suppliers
of labor (more oldsters relative to youngsters means more capital per worker). Fehr,
Jokisch, and Kotlikoff (2003) recently questioned this assertion: if benefits are paid
as promised, increased taxes possibly undermine capital intensity (as in their simu-
lations). Similarly, the rise in education and/or experience boosts workers’ human
capital and possibly reduce capital per efficiency unit of labor. Hence, the net impact
on capital intensity cannot be determined a priori. Our simulations reveal that capital
intensity will rise between 2000 and 2030 and will decrease (very slightly) thereafter.
Such a trend translates into an opposite movement in the interest rates, as shown on
Figure 12. Note that, in 2050, the Canadian interest rate is roughly equal to its current
level whilst the French and US interest rates are below. This reflects that there will be
a net increase in capital intensity between 2000 and 2050 in France and the US, while
the net effect in Canada will be negligible (the rise in 2000-2020 is compensated by the
drop between 2020-2050).
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[Figure 12 about here.]
Changes in capital intensity closely depend on public policies. In our baseline fore-
cast, we assume that all transfers (including social security benefits) are perfectly ad-
justed on the total factor productivity. The government budget is balanced via the
wage income tax. As appearing on Figure 13, this policy induces large changes in the
income tax rate. Between 2000 and 2050, the tax rates increases from 41 to 56 percent in
France, from 31 to 40 percent in Canada and from 13 to 16 percent in the US. These evo-
lutions are mainly driven by the share of social security benefits in GDP (Figure 14). In
France, the share of public pensions amounts to 12 percent and would reach 18 percent
in 2050. In the US, the share would only move from 6 to 8 percent. In Canada, the size
of “Bismarckian” Canadian Pension Plan (CPP) would rise from 4 to 7 percent of GDP.
However, the “Beveridgean” Old Age Security (OAS) scheme is also included in our
simulations (in other individual transfers). On the whole, the Canadian share of total
transfers would rise from 13 to 21 percent of GDP.
[Figure 13 about here.]
[Figure 14 about here.]
Our forecasts of GDP per capita combines all these elements. GDPs per capita from
1900 to 2050 are represented in Figure 15 (in logarithms). Tables 1 and 2 give the sim-
ulated levels and annual growth rates for the five next decades (in USD). In 2000, the
US leadership appears: the Canadian and French levels are respectively 22 and 26 per-
cent below the US level. Despite the adverse demographic shock, the 2050 level will be
roughly twice as important as in 2000. However, population changes should reinforce
the leadership of the US. In 2050, the Canadian and French levels will respectively be 34
and 30 percent below the US level. Hence, France will catch-up and overtake Canada
in 2020.
[Figure 15 about here.]
Demographic movements have a stimulating effect on growth between 2000 and
2010. Thereafter, annual growth rates of GDP per capita are positive but become lower
than the TFP growth after 2010. The minimal growth rates are experienced between
2010 and 2030. In Canada, the GDP per capita increase by less than 1 percent per year
on the period 2020-2030 (despite a growth rate of TFP of 1.84 percent per year).
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[Table 1 about here.]
[Table 2 about here.]
4 Alternative Policies
The evolution of GDP per capita depends on socio-demographic changes (size and
structure of the population, participation rates of men and women, education choices
of future young cohorts) and public policy. If most socio-demographic changes can be
estimated with a relatively high level of accuracy, policy changes are quite uncertain.
More precisely, there is a great deal of uncertainty about the evolution of social security
replacement rates (will the current level of benefit be maintained?) and about the labor
participation rates of old workers (will the retirement age increase?).
Intuitively, these alternative social policies aims at reducing the fiscal burden of
aging. Their impact on the economy are likely to be important. Reducing benefits
should stimulate saving and capital intensity. Increasing the retirement age impacts on
the size of the labor force and on the stock of experience. Lowering income tax alters
the return and the cost of education.
In this section, we evaluate the robustness of our forecasts to policy choices. Two
different policy measures are simulated. First, we consider that the effective retirement
age increases to 63 in all three countries. Such a policy induces major changes on
the French economy where the current effective retirement age is lower than 59. For
Canada and the US, the effect is expected to be smaller (current retirement age are
respectively 61.5 and 62.5).6 Second, we consider a scenario where the level of pension
benefits is adjusted downward so as to keep wage taxes constant over the period 2000-
2050.
Table 3 depicts the growth gain associated to a rise in the effective retirement age.
As expected, such a policy change has a deep impact on the French economy. Between
2020 and 2040, the annual growth rate increases by 0.3-0.4 point of percentage. The
impact is less important in Canada (except in 2020) and negligible in the US. Conse-
6We are aware that there is no systematic mandatory retirement age in the US and Canada. For
these two countries, our “policy change” can be seen as resulting from a private decision to increase
the participation rate when old. By considering exogenous labor supply, we leave the modeling of
incentives to work longer for future research.
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quently, a convergence in retirement age would mainly reduce the gap between France
and the USA (by one third). It would not strongly modify the Canadian position.
[Table 3 about here.]
Table 4 gives the growth gains associated to a budget adjustment through social
security benefits. Such a scenario induces growth gains in all periods and for all coun-
tries. By stimulating capital accumulation, the GDP per capita especially increases in
countries where the fiscal pressure reaches historical records. However, the gains are
quite small (usually lower than 0.1 point of percentage). This policy change has a small
impact on the gap between the different countries.
[Table 4 about here.]
5 Concluding remarks
Statistical methods to perform long-run forecast of economic data are strongly sub-
ject to the Lucas critique. Indeed, it is very unlikely that the estimated relationships
will stay stable over such long period of time, given that changes in the environment
and/or in policy will be large. Methods based on quantitative theory are likely to be
more robust.
Accordingly, we use a general equilibrium overlapping generations model to fore-
cast the level of income per capita in three major developed countries, Canada, France
and the USA. Our model is build so as to integrate the most important sources of
economic growth: it reproduces accumulation of physical capital and human capital
(distinguishing education and experience), increasing participation rates and technical
changes. Such a tool can be calibrated on detailed data, with a special attention to the
demography and the public sector.
Our baseline forecast is based on constant policies (the current level of benefits will
be paid, the effective retirement age and the debt-GDP ratio are constant). We show
that the annual growth rate of GDP per capita will be positive but lower than total
factor productivity growth over the period 2010-2040.
The population aging process differs across countries, both in intensity and timing.
It is interesting to study the implications of these differences in terms of income con-
vergence or divergence. Our results suggest that the gap between the leading country
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(the USA) and the two other countries (France and Canada) will increase significantly
in the next four decades. Moreover, France will catch-up and overtake Canada in 2020.
A change in social policy could alter these conclusions. It is shown that a rise in
retirement age to 63 would be very profitable for France (the gap between France and
the USA would be reduced by one third). A decrease in social security benefits would
slightly stimulate growth but would have no real impact on the gap between the coun-
tries.
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Figure 2:
Growth rate of the population aged 15-64
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Figure 3:
Old Age Dependency (65+ / 15-64)
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Figure 4:
Gt
Growth factor of TFP
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Figure 5:
Wage profile - USA 2000
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Figure 6:
Wage profile - France 2000
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Figure 7:
Wealth profile - USA 2000
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Figure 8:
Asset profile - France 2000
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Figure 9: Education and Experience
Canada (1900-2050)
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Figure 10: Education and Experience
France (1900-2050)
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Figure 11: Education and Experience
 USA (1900-2050)
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Figure 12: Annual interest rate
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Figure 13: Income tax
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Figure 14:
Public pensions in % of gdp
(for Canada, CPP only)
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Figure 15: GDP per capita
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Tables
Table 1: Forecasted levels of GDP per capita (USD)
Canada France USA
2000 21,843 20,769 27,954
2010 27,126 26,490 35,292
2020 30,091 30,539 41,466
2030 32,908 34,289 47,277
2040 37,175 38,899 54,944
2050 42,522 45,035 64,554
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Table 2: Forecasted annual growth rates of GDP per capita
Canada France USA
2000 1.61% 1.39% 2.02%
2010 2.19% 2.46% 2.36%
2020 1.04% 1.43% 1.63%
2030 0.90% 1.16% 1.32%
2040 1.23% 1.27% 1.51%
2050 1.35% 1.48% 1.63%
Table 3: Gain in growth rates of rising the effective retirement age to 63 years
Canada France USA
2000 -0.01% 0.00% -0.01%
2010 0.20% 0.24% 0.10%
2020 0.35% 0.32% 0.04%
2030 0.06% 0.39% 0.00%
2040 0.04% 0.33% 0.00%
2050 0.05% 0.17% 0.01%
Table 4: Gain in growth rates of adjusting pension benefits to keep income tax constant
Canada France USA
2000 0.05% 0.04% 0.02%
2010 0.06% 0.05% 0.03%
2020 0.05% 0.07% 0.03%
2030 0.07% 0.09% 0.03%
2040 0.08% 0.11% 0.03%
2050 0.08% 0.13% 0.03%
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